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I. INTRODUCTION
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, 1 popularly called the New York Convention, entered into
force in the United States on December 29, 1970.2 The purpose of the
Convention is to facilitate and unify the standards by which international
agreements and awards are observed and enforced in the national courts of
signatory states.3 The New York Convention facilitates the use of
international arbitration. International arbitration offers simplicity,
manageable costs, expediency and neutrality as an alternative to traditional
litigation in a remote national court. 4
In the event that a losing party refuses to pay an arbitral award issued
in a foreign state, the New York Convention serves as an enforcement
mechanism. A prevailing party may use the Convention to seek
enforcement of an arbitration award in a signatory State where the losing
party has assets. 5 Pursuant to jurisdiction under the New York Convention,
the successful party need only present a certified copy of the arbitral award
or agreement to a court in the State where enforcement is sought. 6 The
party objecting to enforcement then has the burden of proving that the
award should not be enforced. 7
In the United States, an additional advantage of enforcement under the
New York Convention is that national courts offer greater deference to
* 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997).
See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, art. I(1), 21 U.S.T. 2518, 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 38 [hereinafter New
York Convention]. The New York Convention is codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(1994). The implementing legislation of the Convention makes up Chapter 2 of the
Federal Arbitration Act. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994).
2 The Convention was drafted on June 10, 1958. The United States did not enact
implementing legislation for this treaty until 1970. Currently, there are 106 signatory
States or governments. See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (Supp. 1997).
3 See Susan Choi, Judicial Enforcement of Arbitration Awards Under the ICSID
and New York Conventions, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175, 175 (1996).
4 See id.
5 See id.
6 See id. at 188-189.
7 See id. at 189.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
international arbitration awards than to domestic arbitral awards. 8 It is very
rare that a foreign arbitral award will be vacated under the New York
Convention because to do so the award must fit into one of seven narrow
exceptions for vacating an award listed in the Convention. 9 Thus, most
foreign awards will be enforced under the New York Convention.
However, one of the weaknesses of the New York Convention is its
failure to define several key terms,1 0 such as "arbitral award" or "arbitral
awards not considered as domestic ... in the State where recognition and
enforcement are sought." 11 This lack of clarity has led to nonconformity
between the signatory States in their application of the Convention. 12
In Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc.,' 3 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit examined the applicability of the
New York Convention to a domestically issued arbitration award. The
Seventh Circuit held, in a unanimous decision written by Chief Judge
Posner, that the New York Convention was applicable to a domestically
promulgated arbitration award between two United States citizens if the
dispute arose out of an agreement or contract involving performance in a
foreign State. i4 The holding was a result of the court's use of the language
in 9 U.S.C. § 20215 as a definition for the previously vague provision in
Article I(1) dealing with "arbitral awards not considered as domestic
awards in the State in which their recognition and enforcement are
sought."'1 6 The court's opinion further clarified the United States'
interpretation of the New York Convention and effectively broadened the
jurisdictional scope of the Convention.
8 See Eloise Henderson Bouzari, The Public Policy Exception to Enforcement of
International Arbitral Awards: Implications for Post-NAFTA Jurisprudence, 30 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 205, 211-218 (1995). See discussion infra Part IV.
9 See id. at 207-208; see also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socidt6
Gdn6rale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
10 See Choi, supra note 3, at 215.
11 New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38.
12 See Choi, supra note 3, at 196.
13 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997).
14 See id. at 482.
15 9 U.S.C. § 202.
16 Lander, 107 F.3d at 481-482 (quoting New York Convention, supra note 1, 21
U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38).
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I. FACTS
The dispute in Lander concerned the termination of a contract between
Lander Company and MMP Investments regarding the distribution of
Lander's product in Poland.17 The first contract between MMP and
Lander, a two-year distributorship agreement, was entered into in March
1991.18 Upon its expiration, the parties entered into a technical service
agreement in February 1993 whereby MMP became the exclusive
manufacturer and distributor of Lander's product in Poland for a five-year
period.19
Problems arose in May 1993 when Lander claimed that MMP was
producing a defective product. In an attempt to correct this problem,
Lander's Chairman of the Board made a trip to visit MMP in Poland. The
visit was to no avail, however, and Lander sent MMP a termination notice
in February 1994.20
The contracts between Lander and MMP contained an arbitration
clause requiring that any controversy arising under the agreements be
settled by binding arbitration in New York City in accordance with the
arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.21 Pursuant to
this clause, MMP ffied a request for arbitration with the International Court
of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).22 The
ICC appointed a sole arbitrator from New York to settle the dispute, and
the parties executed a terms of reference in January 1995. Each party
acknowledged that the arbitral tribunal was properly constituted and that
the arbitrator had jurisdiction. 23 On October 31, 1995, the arbitrator issued
an award in favor of Lander in the amount of $536,444.24
The arbitration rules of the ICC make arbitration awards final. When
the parties submit to the arbitral tribunal, they are deemed "'to have waived
17 Lander produces shampoo and other products.
18 See Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 1078, 1079
(N.D. 1. 1996).
19 MMP was to "'use its best efforts to promote the sale of a maximum quantity' of
[Lander's] product 'including the establishment and development of a competent sales
force of adequate size and appointment of capable sub-distributors and an experienced
advertising consultant.'" Id.
20 See id.
21 See Lander, 107 F.3d at 478.
22 See Lander, 927 F. Supp. at 1079.
23 See id.
24 See id.
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their right to any form of appeal insofar as such waiver can be validly
made.' '"25 Therefore, when MMP failed to pay the arbitral award due,
Lander filed a petition to enforce the arbitral award in district court in the
Northern District of Illinois under the New York Convention. 26
In its complaint, Lander alleged that the parties were of diverse
citizenship, that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,00027 and that
jurisdiction existed under 9 U.S.C. §§ 1, 9, 201, 202, 203, 207 and under
28 U.S.C. § 1332.28
MMP filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the New York
Convention failed to provide jurisdiction over domestically issued arbitral
awards. 29 MMP argued that the New York Convention could only be
applied to the enforcement of awards issued in foreign States under Article
I(1) and according to the United States' reciprocity declaration. 30 MMP
also moved to vacate the arbitral award under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA). 31 MMP requested that the district court first make a ruling upon
whether the New York Convention was applicable before it addressed its
motion to vacate under the FAA. 32
Lander opposed MMP's motion to dismiss and argued that the New
York Convention was applicable. However, Lander did not argue that the
arbitration award was enforceable under the FAA. 33
II. ANALYSIS
A. The New York Convention
The New York Convention generally regulates the enforcement of
arbitral awards between private parties. 34 The nationality of the parties is
25 Lander, 107 F.3d at 478 (quoting ICC Rules of Arbitration art. 24(2)).
26 See id. This venue was selected because it is the venue where MMP resides. See
id.
27 The subject matter jurisdiction minimum controversy amount was amended in
October, 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
28 See Lander, 107 F.3d at 478.
29 See id. at 481.
30 See id.
31 See id. at 478. Under the FAA, failure to move to vacate an award will result in
an inability to oppose confirmation. See id.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See Choi, supra note 3, at 175.
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irrelevant. 35 The Convention serves dual purposes; it both recognizes and
enforces foreign arbitral awards. The recognition provisions refer to res
judicata; the Convention prohibits the parties from relitigating the merits of
a previously adjudicated case. The enforcement aspect of the convention is
self-explanatory. 36
Four provisions of the New York Convention are central to an analysis
of whether jurisdiction is proper. These four provisions include Article
I(1), Article 1(3), the U.S. reciprocity declaration and 9 U.S.C. § 202.
Article I(1) offers two separate bases of jurisdiction. 37 The first
provision of Article 1(1) creates jurisdiction under the New York
Convention if the arbitral award is issued in a "State other than the State
where the recognition and enforcement of such awards" is sought.38 The
second provision in Article I(1) states that the Convention shall also. apply
to "arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where
their recognition and enforcement are sought." 39 This provision is called
the nondomestic award provision of Article I(1) and is not defined in the
Convention.
The second relevant provision of the New York Convention is Article
1(3). Article 1(3) authorizes a State, when "signing, ratifying or acceding to
this Convention, or notifying extension under article X hereof, any State
may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to
the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of
another Contracting State."4° Pursuant to Article 1(3), the United States
35 See id. at 188; see also Kenneth T. Unger, The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
Under UNICTRAL's Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, 25 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'LL. 717, 724 (1987).
36 See Unger, supra note 35, at 723.
37 See New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at
38. In its entirety, art. I(1) reads:
This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards
made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and
enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between
persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not
considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and
enforcement are sought.
Id.
3 8 Id. (emphasis added).
39 Id. (emphasis added).
40 Id. at art. 1(3).
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added a reciprocity declaration to the implementing legislation of the
Convention, declaring that it "will apply the Convention, on the basis of
reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only those awards made
in the territory of another Contracting State." 41 Thus, the U.S. reciprocity
declaration limits the jurisdictional scope of the Convention.
Finally, the last relevant provision is the United States Arbitration
Act.42 9 U.S.C. § 202 describes the following awards or agreements as
subject to the jurisdiction of the New York Convention:
An agreement or award arising out of... a relationship which is entirely
between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad,
envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states. 43
If the language in this section is used to define the provision in Article
1(1) dealing with nondomestic awards, it would extend the application of
the New York Convention to disputes between domestic corporations that
enter contracts involving performance abroad. Lander made this argument
in its petition to confirm under the New York Convention.
B. The District Court Opinion
The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the
case, holding that Lander lacked jurisdiction under the New York
Convention. 44 Additionally, the district court held that the court lacked
jurisdiction to enforce the award under the FAA due to Lander's failure to
explicitly raise a claim under that statute.45 Thus, the district court found
Lander's allegations of diversity to be mere surplusage.
The district court held that the nondomestic provision of Article I(1)
could not be used as a basis for creating jurisdiction over a domestically
promulgated award under the New York Convention. 46 According to the
court, rejecting jurisdiction was necessary to avoid an inconsistency
between the Convention and the United States' reciprocity declaration to
41 New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T at 2566, 330 U.N.T.S. at 81.
42 9 U.S.C. § 202.
43 Id. (emphasis added).
44 See Lander, 927 F. Supp. at 1082.
45 See id. at 1078 n. 1.
46 See id. at 1080-1082.
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the Convention. 47 The district court interpreted the U.S. reciprocity
declaration to limit the jurisdictional scope of the Convention solely to the
enforcement of awards promulgated in a separate signatory State from the
one in which the award was granted. 48 Defining Article I(1) in terms of 9
U.S.C. § 202 would be inconsistent with this interpretation of the U.S.
reciprocity declaration. Section 202 authorizes the use of the Convention to
enforce an award in the same State in which the award was issued if the
agreement envisages performance abroad.49 Thus, the district court's
interpretation of the U.S. reciprocity declaration prevented the use of 9
U.S.C. § 202 as a definition for the Article I(1) nondomestic provision.50
As a result, the district court found that jurisdiction was lacking under the
New York Convention to enforce the domestic award.5 '
C. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court, holding that
federal jurisdiction was proper under both the New York Convention and
the FAA.52 First, the Seventh Circuit held that jurisdiction was proper
under the FAA. The court ruled that Lander's allegation of diverse
citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and its citation to 9 U.S.C. § 9,53 could
be read as nothing other than a pleading of jurisdiction under the FAA.54
The court reasoned that MMP's only basis to argue that Lander had not
asserted jurisdiction under the FAA was Lander's failure to explicitly allege
jurisdiction thereunder.55
The Seventh Circuit dismissed MMP's waiver allegation, however,
holding that jurisdiction either exists or it does not, and that it would hold
harmless the "inadvertent failure to cite the statute." 56 To the contrary, the
court held that MMP had waived its ability to challenge jurisdiction through
47 See 9 U.S.C. § 201. See also New York Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3), 21
U.S.T at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. at 38.
48 See Lander, 927 F. Supp. at 1080-1081.
49 See 9 U.S.C. § 202.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See Lander, 107 F.3d at 479.
53 9 U.S.C. § 9 describes which courts have jurisdiction over a dispute under the
Federal Arbitration Act.
54 See Lander, 107 F.3d at 479.
55 See id.
5 6 Id.
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its agreement to be bound by arbitration. Subjecting the case to binding
arbitration, the court held, creates jurisdiction in the courts, which provide
judicial enforcement of arbitral awards.57
After finding that jurisdiction was proper under the FAA, the court
stated that an independent review of jurisdiction under both the FAA and
the New York Convention was necessary because of important distinctions
between the two. 58 The Seventh Circuit explained that the FAA and the
New York Convention create different substantive rights for the parties,
including: differences in the length of the statute of limitations,59
differences in the ease by which an arbitral award may be vacated 60 and
differences in procedural provisions. 61
The Seventh Circuit held that the New York Convention does not have
exclusive jurisdiction within its "domain of jurisdiction." 62 Rather, the
court cited to Article VII of the New York Convention which explicitly
states that the Convention shall not "deprive [a]... party of any right he
may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the
extent allowed by the law."63 Thus, the New York Convention and the
FAA share jurisdiction over disputes such as the one at issue in Lander.64
The last issue the Seventh Circuit addressed before turning to the issue
of jurisdiction over a domestically promulgated award pertained to whether
the venue was proper in the Northern District of Illinois. Under the FAA,
the confirmation of an arbitral award shall occur in either (a) the court
specified in the arbitration agreement between the parties or (b) in the
district where the arbitration was conducted. 65 The arbitration agreement in
57 See id. at 480.
58 See id.
59 The FAA has a short, three-month statute of limitations. See 9 U.S.C. § 12
(1994). By contrast, the New York Convention has a three-year statute of limitations.
See 9 U.S.C. § 207.
60 See id.; see also discussion infra Part IV.
61 See Lander, 107 F.3d at 480. Unlike the FAA, the New York Convention
contains its own procedural provisions.
62 Id. at 481.
63 Id. See also New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T at 2520-2521, 330
U.N.T.S. at 42, 44.
64 It should be noted, however, that the United States Arbitration Act provides that
the New York Convention's terms will govern in the event of a conflict between the
two. See 9 U.S.C. § 208.
65 See 9 U.S.C. § 9. The New York Convention has a similar provision. See 9
U.S.C. § 204.
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Lander did not specify the court in which a petition of confirmation should
be filed; thus, the first venue provision was not met. The petition of
confirmation was filed in the Northern District of Illinois, but the
arbitration was conducted in the Southern District of New York.66 The
second venue provision was therefore also not met. Arguably, venue was
improper.
The Seventh Circuit held, however, that the provision in the FAA
describing the two possible venues merely creates alternatives to the
traditional venues offered to a party in federal court. 67 Lander filed in the
venue in which MMP resides; the district where the defendant resides is a
traditional venue. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit found the Northern
District of Illinois to be a proper venue. The court stated that there was no
reason to force Lander to file in a district less convenient for both parties. 68
Finally, the Seventh Circuit turned its attention to the issue of whether
the district court had jurisdiction to enforce a domestically issued award
under the New York Convention. The Seventh Circuit found that the
district court had proper jurisdiction under Article I(1) and Article 1(3) of
the New York Convention. 69 Interpreting the New York Convention as a
whole, and providing a consistent reading to all provisions, the Seventh
Circuit interpreted the meaning of the nondomestic provision in Article I(1)
to be defined by 9 U.S.C. § 202. The Seventh Circuit found the language
in § 202 to define the nondomestic provision in Article I (1), and thereby
held it to be applicable to the facts in Lander in that the agreement called
for performance in Poland.70
The Seventh Circuit's holding reflected its liberal interpretation of the
United States' reciprocity declaration. The court interpreted the U.S.
reciprocity declaration to limit jurisdiction under the New York Convention
to agreements in which both parties were signatory States of the
Convention.71 The court did not find the reciprocity declaration to require
that the State where enforcement is sought be a State separate from the one
which issued the award. Interpreting the U.S. reciprocity declaration in this
manner, the Seventh Circuit found no inconsistencies in defining the
66 See Lander, 107 F.3d at 480.
67 See id. at 480-481.
68 See id. at 481.
69 See id.
70 See id. at 481-482.
71 See id.
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nondomestic provision of Article I(1) by the language of 9 U.S.C. § 202.72
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Article I(1), Article 1(3) and
the U.S. reciprocity declaration allowed for the enforcement of the
domestically issued arbitral award in Lander.
IV. IMPACT OF L4NDER ON ADR
Because the Seventh Circuit's decision in Lander was so recently
delivered, neither the Supreme Court nor other districts have had the
opportunity to accept, reject or comment upon the holding. However, if the
holding in Lander is adopted universally it could significantly enlarge the
number of domestic arbitral awards which will be enforced under the New
York Convention. Greater enforcement of domestic awards under the
Convention would result in fewer domestic awards being vacated.
Therefore, parties whose arbitral awards fall under the domain of both the
FAA and New York Convention are likely to prefer jurisdiction under the
Convention. 73
The U.S. policy of a "pro-enforcement bias" 74 of foreign arbitral
awards was established by the case of Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co.
v. Soci&6 G6nrale de I'Industrie du Papier.75 The court mandated that the
grounds for vacating an award under the New York Convention be limited
to the seven grounds listed in Article V.7 6 The court also dictated that the
72 See id. at 482.
73 The Seventh Circuit held that the New York Convention does not have exclusive
jurisdiction over its domain, but that it shares jurisdiction with the FAA. See Lander,
107 F.3d at 481.
74 See Bouzari, supra note 8, at 211.
75 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974).
76 The seven grounds include:
(a) invalidity of the arbitration agreement;
(b) violation of due process;
(c) excess by arbitrator of his authority;
(d) irregularity in the composition of the arbitral tribunal or in the
arbitral procedure; and
(e) award not binding, suspended or set aside in the country of
origin.
Additionally, the court can refuse to enforce an award under Article
V(2) if its subject matter is incapable of settlement by arbitration under
the enforcing country's laws or if recognition or enforcement of the
award would violate the enforcing country's public policy.
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public policy ground, the ground most often pled by parties opposing
confirmation of an award, be construed narrowly. The court stated that the
"'[e]nforcement of foreign arbitral awards may be denied on [the public
policy] basis only where enforcement would violate the forum State's most
basic notion of morality and justice." 77
Ironically, it was feared at the time the U.S. became a signatory State
to the New York Convention that the grounds could be used by national
courts to create a loophole in the enforcement of the Convention. 78 Of the
seven grounds, the greatest concern was the broadness of the undefined
"public policy" ground.79 U.S. courts, however, have rarely refused to
enforce a foreign arbitral award because of public policy.80 Similarly, U.S.
courts have rarely vacated foreign arbitral awards because of a violation of
due process. In fact, only in a few cases in which violations were
particularly egregious have parties been successful in vacating an award
under this ground.81 Arguably, therefore, several of the grounds to vacate
an award under the New York Convention exist in theory only.82
Domestic arbitration awards, by contrast, are often vacated under the
FAA because they are subject to the expansive ground of "manifest
disregard of the law."8 3 Additionally, U.S. courts have used a "public
policy" basis to vacate domestic arbitral awards under the FAA, though the
statute contains no language to this effect. 84 Possible reasons for this
greater deference to foreign arbitral awards under the New York
Convention than to domestic awards under the FAA85 include comity or
respect for the "'capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals,' "86 and
Choi, supra note 3, at 189 (paraphrasing New York Convention, supra note 1, 21
U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42) (footnotes omitted).
77 Bouzari, supra note 8, at 211 (quoting Parsons, 508 F.2d at 974).
78 See id. at 208.
79 See id.
80 See Choi, supra note 3, at 199, 206; see also Bouzari, supra note 8, at 208.
81 See Choi, supra note 3, at 208.
82 See Bouzari, supra note 8, at 212.
83 Id. at 207.
84 See id. at 208, 212-214.
85 A comparison of the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards under the New York
Convention versus domestic awards under the FAA demonstrates that a foreign award is
much less likely to be vacated. For a complete comparative analysis, see Bouzari, supra
note 8, at 213-218.
86 Bouzari, supra note 8, at 215 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985)).
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stare decisis.87
However, in light of the "pro-enforcement bias" of the New York
Convention, 88 the Lander opinion could greatly increase the number of
domestic arbitral awards which will be enforced under the New York
Convention. Increased use of the New York Convention may lead to the
greater enforcement of arbitral awards and agreements in the U.S. in terms
of international commerce.
Jennifer Dawn Nicholson
87 See id. at 216.
88 The Seventh Circuit alluded to this bias in its opinion. However, the court did
not give its opinion of whether or not the bias existed. See Lander, 107 F.3d at 480.
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